Our intelligence assessment was that the best areas for our renewed search would be the western and northern sides of Nui Thi Vai. We also left our headquarters tents erected so there was no change in the appearance of the base. D Company of 6 RAR, which was to protect our FSB, was inserted among the daily resupply convoys, so there was no obvious increase in our normal traffic movements. This was done over the last day of the convoy movements, as part of our normal armoured road patrols. B and C Companies could commence their insertions from their present locations on Route 15, but both A and D Companies had to be relocated from their southern positions. To this end we planned on approaching along four separate company routes with Battalion Headquarters (BHQ) and its protective Anti-Tank and Assault Pioneer platoons initially following A Company. Time was critical, as we needed to be well clear of the road and concealed in the jungle before the VC realised we were gone. Once the road convoys stopped it would be expected that we would regroup before moving again towards Nui Thi Vai. It was a fair assumption that our fire support base (FSB) location would also have been noted and the volume of traffic associated with it detected. We knew that some Viet Cong (VC) were still up on Nui Thi Vai and that the passage of the road convoys would have been observed and reported, as would our security activities along Route 15. He quickly endorsed the battalion’s obvious desire to attend to what it considered to be unfinished business, and let it get on with the job.ĭeception was a major factor in our planning for Operation Queanbeyan. As described at the end of the previous chapter, Brigadier Jackson understood that 5 RAR, having mounted the previous operation, was already familiar with the terrain and the enemy’s tactics and was best suited to conduct a follow-up operation.
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Max Carroll, Michael Deak (Michael von Berg) and Barry CampbellĬlearly, the need for 5th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (5 RAR), to leave the Nui Dinh hills to play its part in Operation Robin left 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) with many unanswered questions about follow-up action to the events of Operation Canberra. Operation Queanbeyan – October 1966: Unfinished Business from Operation Canberra The Enemy: Uncontested Tenancy Prior to the Arrival of 1 ATF 5th Battalion Decorations and Awards: Vietnam 1966–67
STEALTH ATTRACTION RAR RAR
Conclusion: The Development of a 5 RAR Approach John Warr as Commanding Officer: His Approach to the War The Development of the Reconnaissance Platoon The Medical Problems of Operations in the Hills Fire Support: 103 Field Battery Royal Australian Artillery in Action
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Advisers? Activities Beyond the Battalion Contact with the Enemy – Through Soldiers’ Eyes
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Into the Hills: Operations Canberra and Robin – October 1966 Intelligence Work in Phuoc Tuy after Long Tan Facing New Realities: From Holsworthy to Nui Dat